April 06, 2022

Boston City Council c/o Alex Geourntas, City Clerk Boston City Hall, Room 601 Boston, MA 02201 Mayor Michelle Wu Boston City Hall, Suite 500 Boston, MA 02201

RE: Metro Boston Homeland Security Region (MBHSR) contract renewal

To Mayor Wu and the Boston City Council,

In the late spring of 2021, the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) worked with former Mayor Kim Janey to execute contracts to maintain and enhance the Critical Infrastructure Monitoring System (CIMS) and the Public Safety Network (PSnet), continuing the City of Boston's participation and leadership within the Metro Boston Homeland Security Region (MBHSR). CIMS is the region's camera network, consisting of nine independent municipalities tied together through a central hub to improve regional collaboration and integration of public safety systems. The CIMS network was launched in 2003 and is supported by grant funding from the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI). The PSnet infrastructure system provides interconnection, IP transport, and other backbone and key IT services to support the network. Together, CIMS and PSnet are used to identify criminal activity, assist emergency services personnel responding to incidents, monitor transportation networks and traffic conditions, and generally keep the Metro Boston region safe and secure.

Over the last several years, the Boston City Council has worked alongside advocates and community members to strengthen our standards around transparency and oversight regarding the public use of surveillance technology. The City of Boston recognizes that protecting residents' privacy and civil liberties is essential to maintaining public trust in government, and OEM is committed to working alongside our partners in the MBHSR to uphold those values. Surveillance technology and data gathering are important tools to protect public safety and security and deliver effective City services, and OEM looks forward to working with the Boston City Council and other partners to develop and approve surveillance use policies that are clear, effective, transparent, and consistent with An Ordinance Banning Facial Recognition Technology in Boston and An Ordinance on Surveillance Oversight and Information Sharing, the latter of which goes into effect in July 2022.

Since the CIMS and PSnet contracts were extended in 2021, OEM has worked in concert with our regional partners in the MBHSR to strengthen the policies governing the shared camera network. MBHSR's CIMS Policy establishes clear guidelines around the authority to operate the CIMS network, the protocol for requesting access to CIMS cameras in other jurisdictions, documentation requirements for cross-jurisdictional access, maintenance of a camera inventory, prohibition on sound recording, oversight by the MBHSR Jurisdictional Points of Contact (JPOC) Committee, and annual reports from City of Boston OEM, which compiles audits performed by individual jurisdictions. The Policy clearly prohibits usage of the CIMS network in ways that violate the public right to privacy; constitute harassment or intimidation; are based on race, ethnicity, or other protected characteristic; or infringe upon First Amendment rights. The Boston Police Department has also adopted or strengthened policies for access by MBHSR partners to cameras controlled by BPD.

The new Administration in the City of Boston offers an important opportunity to rethink Boston's role in the MBHSR; reshape the baseline of privacy, transparency, and accountability for regional programming; and exercise the influence of Boston's seat among MBHSR peer jurisdictions to determine the future of critical systems like CIMS and PSnet. I am confident that given the appropriate time for meaningful engagement with all stakeholders, the City of Boston and our MBHSR partners will develop an intentional and comprehensive set of recommendations on ways to enhance transparency, accountability, responsibility and equity. While we pursue broader conversations to ensure sound oversight of these programs, we must also maintain a proactive readiness posture, including the continuation of these critical services.

For these reasons, I respectfully recommend extending the CIMS (May 2022) and PSNET (June 2022) contracts for one year and support the technology refresh and network assessment, while simultaneously engaging in regional dialogue that will result in pathways for change. I welcome further engagement and look forward to working with the Wu Administration and the Boston City Council to uphold our shared values of privacy, transparency, and public accountability.

Respectfully submitted,

Shumeane Benford

Chief, Emergency Management

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# Critical Infrastructure Monitoring System Policy Metro Boston Homeland Security Region



Boston • Brookline • Cambridge • Chelsea • Everett • Quincy • Revere • Somerville • Winthrop



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## 1. Introduction

#### 1.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this Metro Boston Homeland Security Region (MBHSR) Critical Infrastructure Monitoring System (CIMS) Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Policy is to: 1) identify an overarching organizational construct and organizing principles for a regional CIMS network; 2) delineate specific roles and responsibilities of individual jurisdictions, and; 3) ensure a process for information sharing that aligns with the protection of civil liberties of residents and visitors to the region.

Goal 2 of the MBHSR Homeland Security Strategy (2022 – 2027), "Strengthen the Region's capabilities to protect its Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR)," includes Objective 2.3: Strengthen infrastructure systems, which identifies the need to enhance monitoring of infrastructure, as well as maintain and improve existing infrastructure systems such as law enforcement analytics tools and gunshot detection. Critical infrastructure includes those assets, systems, networks, and functions—physical or virtual—so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. Key resources are publicly or privately controlled resources essential to minimal operation of the economy and the government.

The CIMS program may also be used to deter criminal activity and public disorder, reduce fear of crime, identify criminal activity and suspects, identify and gather possible evidence for use in criminal and civil court actions, document police actions, safeguard citizen and police officer rights, aid in Amber alerts or in the search for lost/missing children or elderly people, assist emergency services personnel when responding to incidents, assist with the monitoring of traffic conditions, evacuation route status, monitor transportation networks (airports, waterways, highways, tunnels, transit, intermodal), events and attractions, government facilities, severe weather events and otherwise assist officials with the provision of municipal services in order to enhance overall municipal efficiency, and assist with the training of department personnel.

#### 1.2 HISTORICAL CONTEXT

The purpose of the CIMS program is to enhance the management of emergency situations, detect and deter terrorism, and otherwise protect the health, safety and welfare of those who live and work in, visit, and transact business with the Region.

The MBHSR CIMS network was launched in 2003 in preparation for the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Boston in July of 2004. This network was made possible with the awarding of the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) grant to the City of Boston and 8 surrounding cities and towns. The purpose of this project was to enhance collaboration and information sharing amongst law enforcement agencies in the region in order to keep residents safe, and more effectively and efficiently investigate crimes, with a focus on critical infrastructure within the region.



CIMS Successful Use Cases:

### **Boston Marathon Bombing, April 2013**

During the 2013 Boston Marathon, two terrorists planted and detonated two homemade pressure cooker bombs near the finish line on Boylston Street in Boston. The resulting blast left 3 individuals dead and hundreds more injured. During the subsequent investigation, the CIMS cameras in Boston were utilized by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies to help in the identification of the two terrorists responsible as officials were able to share images of the suspects just 3 days later.

#### Winthrop Shooting, June 2021

In June of 2021, a man shot and killed two Winthrop residents in a race-fueled attack. He had stolen a box truck and crashed into a home before going on foot and began shooting. CIMS camera usage in the area allowed Winthrop Police to determine the suspect's intent based on the video footage of the route he took.

Emerging and unique threats facing the Nation and the MBHSR have created significant challenges that support the need for a collaborative and interoperable camera network.

#### 1.3 ASSUMPTIONS

The following planning assumptions underpin the MBHSR CIMS Policy:


- This policy refers only to UASI-funded cameras within the region.
- The MBHSR CIMS Policy is the baseline agreed upon set of guiding principles that all
  jurisdictions will adhere to. Individual jurisdictions may choose to enact more strict policies
  at the local level.
- Jurisdictions are responsible for identifying critical infrastructure within their municipality.
- As technology continues to improve and become more advanced, the region must ensure it is
  updating its plans and policies in order to ensure the protection of civil liberties for citizens
  and visitors to the MBHSR.
- The MBHSR will routinely conduct audits to study funding decisions and their impact in order to better improve the CIMS program and make fiscally sound decisions.
- Some cameras may be located in a location where two jurisdictions share a border. These
  instances are left to those jurisdictions to decide how to proceed with regards to shared (or not
  shared) access to said cameras.
- While Cambridge is a part of the MBHSR, they do not participate in the CIMS program.



# 2. ORGANIZATION

### 2.1 PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS

The MBHSR is comprised of nine (9) communities: Boston, Brookline, Cambridge, Chelsea, Everett, Quincy, Revere, Somerville, and Winthrop. All communities **except for Cambridge** participate in the CIMS program.



The following table depicts the number UASI CIMS cameras located within each MBHSR jurisdiction as of January 2022.

Boston	996
Brookline	12
Cambridge	Does not participate in the CIMS program
Chelsea	175
Everett	100
Quincy	115
Revere	69
Somerville	46
Winthrop	75



## 3. OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT

#### 3.1 AUTHORITY TO OPERATE

The Commissioner/Chief or his/her designee within each jurisdiction will designate the number of System Administrators allowed to grant and oversee access to the CIMS network. Those designated System Administrators have the ability to create groups within their jurisdiction and assign permissions based upon job function or assignment.

Permissions are determined by the System Administrator and include the capabilities to view, rewind, download, or restrict camera footage. System Administrators are designated based upon their subject matter expertise to the MBHSR CIMS program and do not hold operational functions that would create a conflict of interest.

Jurisdictions may utilize the CIMS camera network at local dispatch areas, the front desk of public safety buildings, jurisdictional Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs), or where deemed necessary consistent with the purposes of the CIMS set forth in Section 1.1 above.

When authorized to do so by a jurisdiction, a requesting jurisdiction within the MBHSR will have the ability to view images/video produced by the CIMS cameras of the jurisdiction that has authorized and granted such access. MBHSR jurisdictions will designate that the Police Commissioner/Chief or their designee shall have exclusive authority to authorize other jurisdictions within the MBHSR to view, on an ongoing or time-limited basis and in real time only, footage recorded by the CIMS cameras. Other jurisdictions within the MBHSR may request a copy of archival footage produced by a jurisdiction's CIMS cameras pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 5.2 of this policy.

#### 3.2 EXTERNAL USERS

The Commissioner/Chief or his/her designee will review requests made for archived CIMS camera footage or requests for 'real time' viewing of specific cameras and approve based on the nature of the request. (See Section 5.2) When authorized to do so by a jurisdiction, a requesting jurisdiction within the MBHSR or external agency will have the ability to view images/video produced by the CIMS cameras of the jurisdiction that has authorized and granted such access.

MBHSR jurisdictions will designate that the Police Commissioner/Chief or their designee shall have exclusive authority to authorize partners outside of their own jurisdiction the ability to view, on an ongoing or time-limited basis and in real time only, footage recorded by the CIMS cameras. Outside agencies to a jurisdiction may request a copy of archival footage produced by a jurisdiction's CIMS cameras pursuant to the procedures set forth in Section 5.2 of this policy.

Traditionally, requests for archived or real time CIMS footage will be made in advance in order to allow for proper review of the request. However, in the event of a major incident with regional significance, a Commissioner/Chief or his/her designee may allow external authorization to view, in real time, cameras on the CIMS network. In order for this to occur, the two parties must both be operating on a compatible version of their viewer system.



#### 3.3 24/7 RECORDING

The CIMS network is active twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week ("24/7"). No personnel are assigned specifically to observe video monitor screens. Jurisdictions shall maintain a list of locations where monitors shall be located.

The network servers shall be maintained in a secure environment. Recording shall be stored in such a manner that the particular images can be identified by camera location and by the date and time recorded. Unless requested through the process outline in section 5.1, camera footage will be overwritten after no more than thirty (30) days.

#### 3.4 CAMERA CAPABILITIES

Cameras deployed as part of the MBHSR CIMS may have pan-tilt-zoom ("PTZ") or thermal capability. Cameras that are part of the CIMS network shall not utilize facial recognition capabilities if available.

Except during an active investigation, jurisdictions shall not utilize automatic identification or automatic tracking capabilities with CIMS cameras.

#### 3.5 CAMERA INVENTORY

Jurisdictions shall create and maintain a camera inventory of all cameras placed into service as part of the CIMS. This inventory will include installation date, location, brand/model, and dates out of service.

#### 3.6 No Sound Recordings

The CIMS shall not monitor or record sound unless appropriate court orders are obtained.

### 4. DOCUMENTATION OF ACCESS

#### 4.1 DOCUMENTING CROSS JURISDICTIONAL CAMERA ACCESS

A jurisdiction within the MBHSR may request archived camera footage from another jurisdiction in the event of a criminal investigation or access to live camera footage in instances such as preplanned major events (ie; Boston Marathon). In the event that access is granted to an outside jurisdiction (in accordance with section 4.1), the record of access will be documented and stored to capture the incident number, name of requestor, as well as the location and time of the requested video evidence. This will help support audits of the CIMS network and be used to impact future strategic decision making with regards to the CIMS program.



#### 4.2 REQUEST PROCESS

In order to make a request to an MBHSR jurisdiction, the following form will utilized. This process is currently utilized in Boston by Boston Police with the link to this form located here:

All other (8) jurisdictions will utilize a form that will be initially hosted by Boston OEM until individual jurisdictions are able to get a similar version of this form hosted and owned by their own agencies. Once completed, forms will be sent to a jurisdiction's Commissioner/Chief or his/her designated System Administrators to review and either approve or deny the request. Requests made from other law enforcement agencies will be handled by the system administrator themselves, while all requests made from civilians will be sent to a local jurisdiction's legal department for review and input on the request.

### 5. OVERSIGHT

#### 5.1 CIMS OVERSIGHT

The CIMS project is overseen and managed by the MBHSR JPOC Committee. The Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) Subcommittee will support the JPOC Committee with recommendations based upon subject matter expertise.

### 5.2 ENSURING TRANSPARENCY AND PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES

To ensure transparency and communication with local governments, the Boston Office of Emergency Management will provide an annual report compiled from audits performed by individual jurisdictions. These reports will identify the number of CIMS cameras within a jurisdiction, the number of users on the network and their permission levels, the number of archived video requests that were approved for footage on CIMS cameras, as well as the amount of instances where real-time camera access was granted by a jurisdiction to a requesting agency.

Anyone who engages in an impermissible use of the MBHSR CIMS may be subject to criminal prosecution per M.G.L., civil liability, and/or administrative sanctions, including termination, pursuant to and consistent with the relevant collective bargaining agreements and Department policies.

Violations of this Policy occur when an individual utilizes the MBHSR CIMS network for purposes including but not limited to;

• Invasion of Privacy. Except pursuant to a court order, it is a violation of this Policy to observe, or record footage of, locations except those that are in public view from a vantage point that is accessible to the general public and where there is no reasonable expectation of privacy. Areas in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy include the interior of private premises such as a home.



- Harassment / Intimidation. It is a violation of this Policy to use the MBHSR CIMS to harass and/or intimidate any individual or group.
- Use / Observation Based on a Protected Characteristic. It is a violation of this Policy to use the MBHSR CIMS to observe individuals solely because of their race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, disability or other classification protected by law.
- Personal Use. It is a violation of this Policy to use the CIMS for any personal purpose.
- First Amendment Rights. It is a violation of this Policy to use the MBHSR CIMS for the purpose of infringing upon First Amendment rights.

# 6. ADMINISTRATOR

#### 6.1 POLICY APPROVAL

The MBHSR CIMS Policy is effective upon approval from the MBHSR Jurisdictional Points of Contact (JPOCs). Boston Office of Emergency Management (OEM) shall maintain the official copy of the approved policy.

#### 6.2 POLICY MAINTENANCE

Under the direction and oversight of the Boston Office of Emergency Management (OEM), the JPOC Committee shall be responsible for the revision, update, and distribution of the MBHSR CIMS Policy. The JPOC Committee will ensure that the Policy is reviewed on an annual basis, at a minimum, so that it remains current and operative.